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The Benson Report:

actionaryview
o community Iwcentres
by Bryant Garth
This review will concentrate on one aspect of the twovolume, 1,600 page Final Report of the Royal Coinmission on Legal Services - legal services for the poor and within that topic will concentrate on the so-called
public sector. In Great Britain, that sector is now represented by some 30 'neighbourhood law centres' with
a total of 75 lawyers, as compared to some 34,000
private solicitors nationally (Final Report, vol 1, Subsection 50.10, cited here as 1:50.10). In 1977-78, these
law centres received an estimated Eng.Pds.1.3 million
in public funds (11:3.17) (versus Eng.Pds 81 million for
legal aid through the private profession: 1:5.24).
While relatively small in number, inadequately
funded, and dependent on a variety of unstable lo,;al
and central sources, it is clear that, as the Commission recognized, 'the lawyers who work in law centres
have exercised an influence in recent years out of proportion to their numbers' (1:2.22). These centres have
gradually increased in number since the first one was
established in 1969, and they have forced a national debate on the extent that such salaried legal services are necessary to supplement tile judicare system and on what
role those salaried services should play. The existence of
that debate is one reason why a Royal Commission on
Legal Services became necessary, and it was hoped that
the Commission's Report would resolve the difficult
questions raised in that debate. Unfortunately, while
the issues have been addressed, I do not think the Report
satisfactorily resolves the key problems of the organization, management, and operation of the public sector.
Those problems will be examined here from a comparative perspective.
My general thesis is that the Commission faced the
difficult dilemma raised by legal services which seem to
blur the traditional distinction between neutral professionalism and political action. Instead of attempting to
resolve this dilemma, however, the Commission elected
to cement itself to certain professional values that simply
do not fit well with the modern notion of neighborhood
law firms for the poor. In part, I disagree with the
Report's political conclusions, but more importantly,
the Report's conclusions are inconsistent with its own
articulated assumptions and values.
Indeed, there is a general irony that permeates the
Report. Several observers, well-informed about developments in a number of countries, have recently described
a trend toward lay participation or even control over affairs long thought to be within the exclusive domain of
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professional legal self-regulation. 1 One very prominent
example of this new political accountability was the
Royal Commission on Legal Services, which contained
a majority of non-lawyers. 2 Now the Commission has
reported, and it not only defends lawyers quite vigorously,
but also sprinkled throughout the Report are paeans to
legal professionalism, including the principle of 'selfregulation' (see, eg., 1:3.18, 3.19). Non-lawyer scrutiny
has resulted in a policy favoring more deference to lawyers. Without making too much of the point - of course
some lay participation is encouraged in the Report - one
might begin by noting that the Commission was not
really lay-dominated. It was composed almost entirely
of professionals, even if non-laywer professionals. It
might be suggested that this Report was an example of
the existence of a general class interest among professionals. In fact, other professions may be especially anxious to protect the privileges of lawyers. Lawyers represent one of the proto-typical professions, and historically the characteristics of lawyers and doctors have
served as paradigms for the aspirations of other professional groups. If lawyers are deprived of certain professional privileges, other, less well-established, professions
are in even greater danger. There may thus be a reason
why the Commission appeared at times to have been
more zealous than the Law Society in protecting the perceived professional interests of lawyers.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE PUBLIC
SECTOR IN LEGAL SERVICES - THE
COMMISSION VS. THE LAW CENTRES
The Commission strongly supported an increase in the
role and extent of the public sector - staff offices as
opposed to judicare - in the British legal aid and advice
scheme. '[A] n increase in the number of law centres in
deprived areas' was urged as a matter requiring'particular
attention' 0:44.5). To accomplish this increase, the
Commission did not simply encourage the proliferation
of law centres as presently organized. Instead, it proposed a new system of law centres, which it hoped would
incorporate the present 'neighbourhood law centres.'
The new system would be built around institutions to be
termed 'citizens' law centres' (CLCs) (L8.17 -8.39).
As described in the Commission Report, 'The main
purpose of a CLC should be to provide legal advice: assistance, and representation in its locality,' and 'It should
lay particular emphasis on work where there is a deficienciy in existing legal services, in particular in the areas
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of social welfare law' (1:8.18). Criminal and domestic
matters would continue to be the responsibility of
private practitioners under judicare (1:8.32(d), 8.3). The
CI.Cs would be set up, controlled and financed by a new
central agency, 'a small part-time committee and a secretariat appointed by the Lord Chancellor and financed
by grant in aid paid out of his Vote' (1:82.5; see also
6.29). All dependency on local government or charitable
contributions would be eliminated. In each centre, there
would be 'a senior lawyer answerable for the work done,
including that done by volunteers, and the management
of the centre' (1:8.32(b)), and the lawyers in each CLC,
or group of CLCs, would be advised by 'a local committee composed of residents and representatives of organizations in the areas' (1:8.26). Finally, the supervision of
the overall legal aid scheme, including the decisions about what percentage of funds should go to the public
and private sectors, would be entrusted to the Lord
Chancellor, advised and aided in some executive functions by a 'Council of Legal Services' modelled on the
present Legal Aid Advisory Committee (see 1:6.14 - 6.26),
by the committee on CLCs, and by a number of 'regional
committees' (6.32 - 6.37).
Among Western legal aid systems, this proposal fits
in very nicely among the more progressive ones. The system would operate as a well-funded, 'cornbined'judicarestaff system such as that advocated by many commentators, myself included. It is not surprising, therefore,
that nauch of the liberal commentary has been favorable
to the Commission's proposals, which seem finally to
assure the preservation of a staff system that will supplement judicare. 3 The Commission, moreover, recognized that there is a dimension to legal aid beyond simply service work for individuals. It provided for some representation of groups, and for some test cases (1: 12.57 12.65, 13.26).
Before concluding that these proposals are the
best that could have been made, however, one must consider the limitations. The inquiry can begin by highlighting some of the differences between the Royal
Commission's position and the proposals of the existing
law centres. United under the name of the Law Centres
Working Group (now called the Law Centres Federation), the existing law centres made several proposals to
the Commission for new institutions to oversee the
legal aid scheme. All of those proposals were rejected,
including tile wide-supported suggestion of a quasiindependent Legal Services Commission (see 1:6.15).
More important, however, than any such proposal
from the point of view of the Law Centres Federation,
was the complete absence in the Final Report of any
provisions for continuation and enhancement of the
functions of the Federation. And the Federation failed
entirely to sell the Commission on the importance of
two related points - first, on tile priority of 'groupwork
and community education,' and second, on the principle of 'community control' by lay dominated manage4
ment committees.
Several documents submitted to the Commission,
including the general evidence of the Working Group
and the Adamsdown Law Centre's long 'empirical assessment' of 'community need and law centre practice,'
tried to justify through examples the need for local,
lay control, and for law centre strategies that involved
reaching out into communities through community
workers and management committees, even to the
point of stirring up 'campaigns'. s

To these arguments the Commission had no direct
response, but the tone of the Report indicates the
Commission's attitude toward the existing law centres.
First, the Commission significantly mischaracterized
the position of the law centres in order to bolster negative conclusions about law centre work. For example,
the law centres' strong ideological commitment to local
control was explained in one part of the Report as
merely an effort to give the local community 'a sense
of participation' in law centre work (1:8.6). In another
place, the attachment to local control was explained by
the Commission as related to the fact that 'funds for
law centres have come from a variety of sources'
(1:8.26). By treating local control as at best a temporary
necessity, wihich provides only a symbolic value, the
Commission made the principle appear unimportant.
Its recommendation for an 'advisory committee' was
therefore seen as much less of a break with the current
law centres' position than in fact it actually was.
In addition, when describing the funcfiopi, of the
existing law centres, the Commission emphasized the
diversity of law centres and that only 'sonic' centres
'assisted groups campaigning against bad housing, unemployment, and other problems' (1:8.8). The Working Group had been much more emphatic, and it had
authority to assert the collective position of the law
centres. The Working Group evidence even stated that
law centres 'should concentrate exclusively upon ......
test cases, group work and educational work', rather
than on the individual service work which the Commission favored. Sim~ilarly, the predominence of group
work was explained elsewhere in the Final Report as
the result of 'the heavy workload of some centres'
(1:8.14), rather than as basic to law centre work.
The Commission chose therefore to ignore the
law centres' own experience and their characterization of it. Local control, group work, and related edu.cational efforts were not seen by the Commission as
among 'the special qualities which have marked the
formative years of law centres' (1:8.3). 'Campaigns,'
although rather vaguely defined, with no mention of
the role of lay personnel in such activities, were simply
condemned as 'inappropriate' (1:8.21; see also 8.19 8.20), and the provisions for management ignored local
control. The Law Centres Federation thus met rejection
on two closely-connected matters it had deemed absolutely vital to successful law centre work. Tlat the importance of this rejection was recognized by the Commission is suggested by the tactical decision to use the
promise of extra funding (or the threat of its cut-off)
to 'invite' existing law centres to convert to citizens'
law centres rather than simply to incorporate them
automatically into the new system.
The central theme of the Commission Report is
'professionalism,' and the Commission found professionalism wanting in the existing law centres. In the
Commission's opinion, law centres generally should provide the same kinds of services as private lawyers, even
if in different substantive legal areas - 'poverty law,' as
opposed to divorce, criminal defense, and conveyancing
(1:8.14). Professionalism, moreover, was considered
synonomous with accountability to other legal professionals: 'We believe that, if the law centres are to
provide an adequate professional service, it is essential that the professional conduct of lawyers employed
in law centres should remain the responsibility of their
professional bodies' (1,:8.35). Furthermore,. to quote
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from the Report again, 'we do not think it right for
people who have no knowledge of the law or the
handling of legal problems and possibfly little experience
in managing an office, to be expected to assume direct
responsibility for the professional work of a CLC'
(1:8.26). Non-lawyers were thought both unlikely to be
good managers of legal offices and incapable of acquiring the legal knowledge necessary to supervise a staff of
lawyers. Finally, as noted before, professionalism clearly meant for the Commission the absence of 'political'
work by centre staff- lawyers or others- that mobilizes
a sector of the community to pursue legal rights (1:8.20).
Such activity was simply deenied 'inappropriate.' Professioaials should only react to clients seeking legal counsel.
It is instructive to contrast the attitude of the Commission toward Citizens' Advice Bureaux (CABx) with
their attitude towards law centres. The chapter on CABx
is full of praise for the institution as presently organized
(1:7). The Commission expressed little concern about
the quality standards for the one million 'legal' problems
handled by the mainly volunteer staff of the 676 CABx
in England and Wales (1:7.6). The Commission essentially supported self-regulation by the National Association of Citizens' Advice Bureaux (NACAB) (1:7.20), and
local management through 'an independent management
committee representing local interests and voluntary
and statutory bodies' (1:7.6). This kind of dual system
of management was very close to what the Law Centres
Federation had proposed in 1978. They wished to divide
basic responsibility between the Law Centres Federation
and local management committees. The Commission
clearly felt, however, that law centres had to be regulated differently than CABx, and the reason appears 'o be
that law centres were seen only as collections of lawyers,
not advice agencies, community service organizations, or
antipoverty action groups. Special means, above and beyond codes of ethics, were considered necessary to ensure
that staff lawyers in law centres live up to certain professional standards that would not apply to the CABx'
primarily lay personnel. This issue was not quality control; had it been, the Commission would have been more
concerned about volunteers at CABx, who provide a
tremendous amount of legal advice. Law centres raised
questions about the proper professional demeanour of
a purely legal office, and as a result there could be little
support for the expansion of the model proposed by
the current law centres in their evidence to the Royal
Commission.
CONTRASTING
MODELS
OF
STAFF
LAWYERS FOR THE POOR: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
The Commission attempted to apply a purely professional model to neighbourhood law centres and similar
institutions, and that attempt ignored the ambiguity
displayed throughout the recent history of staff lawyers
for the poor in many countries throughout the Western world. The problem cannot be resolved through a
simple application of traditional professional standards.
Rather, two related models of neighborhood law firms
(NLFs) have tended to coexist, and only evolutions and
'reforms' have operated to eliminate certain aspects of
one or the other.
The NLFs founded in 1965 as part of the Office
of Economic Opportunity's (OEO) War on Poverty in
the United States reflected a tension between two approaches to legal services for the poor - the 'professional
August 1980
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approach' and what I will call here the 'communityoriented social change' approach. The two approaches
then shared a general perspective on legal services and
the need for 'social change,' but they had substantial
differences in tactics. The professional approach - like
that favored now by the Royal Commission - meant
an emphasis on individual casework. on governance by
legal professionals, and on purely legal activities - advice
and representation of clients who come to the office.
A 'community-oriented, social change approach' would
have meant seeing NLFs as antipoverty agencies, not
traditional law offices subsidized by the public. It
would have implied an effort to build constituencies
.around legal issues and to enable community members

50

to set basic NLF policies and priorities. It also stressed
the role of lay advocates and community workers - nonlawyers who could develop strong ties with local organ.
Izations.
6
At first the models seemed to coexist successfully.
The general participatory ideology of the War on Poverty
was reflected in devices to encourage some representat.
ion of the poor on local governing boards. Pamphlets
issued by OEO even suggested that the social change
commitment of the program might imply proactive
strategies to mobilize and even organize groups from the
local community. "
Such tendencies toward the less professional approach were relatively unimportant, however, and an
early alliance with. the organized bar ensured that the
NLF program would develop as an essentially professional one. The program administrators required that 60
percent of local governing board members be lawyers.
Little work took place with the actual aim of strengthening and mobilizing local groups a, and community
liason workers, when appointed, had difficulties because
of the evolving profession emphasis. 9 NLFs relied
heavily on only two strategies -service work for individuals and test cases for 'social change.' Neither meant
much work to mobilize local groups.
Nevertheless, purely professional strategies such
as law reform through test cases did become very controversial. The program was even threatened with extinction. The close alliance with the organized bar, however,
enabled the U.S. system to survive political challenges.
When the Legal Services Corporation finally replaced
OEO in 1975, there was less of an emphasis on law ref.
orm through test cases, but the overriding concern with
legal professionalism continued just as before.
The first Chairman of the Board of Directors of the
Legal Services Corporation made the professional mandate clear: 'The legal services program is set on a road
that emphasizes professional quality, and the board intends to provide the leadership necessary to ensure that
the poor receive the same quality and range of service
that Is provided to the rich'. 10 The assumptions of legal professionalism have also been apparent in the Corporation's funding strategy, according to which the goal of
legal aid Is to satisfy the primarily individual 'legal
needs' revealed by empirical research. To date this strategy has resulted in large funding increases, from $71.5
million in 1974 to $300 million in 1980. And this year,
the 'minimum access' goal of two lawyers for every
10,000 poor persons everywhere in the country will be
met. Professionalism has thus far worked well in preserving and expanding NLFs in the United States.
The history of neighbourhood law centres in Great
Britain might then be seen as following the pattern set
out in the United States. The British law centres had
moved very strongly toward a community-oriented
social change approach, for which they had found support in British antipoverty policy of the Urban Programme
and Community Development Projects. Those programs
were very similar to War on Poverty programs in the
United States." In fact, four law centres began as
part of Community Development Projects (11:3.7),
and more than one-third of all law centre funds came
from the Urban Programme (primarily from the central
government Home Office) (11:3.17). The Law Centres
Federation in turn advocated an antipoverty approach.
Even the Law Society had moved to a point where it at
least accepted the principle of local control for law cen-
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tres, and the Law Society's evidence to the Commission did not challenge the centres' work with groups.
The Law Society in fact criticized certain aspects of the
alternative law centres that had been authorized by the
Legal Advice and Assistance Act 1972 but never implemented. They were deficient, according to the Law
Society, because, among other things, of doubt about
the possibility of hiring 'social workers' and the lack of
'means of involving local organizations or other representatives of the community in the management of a
law centre .. . or of delegaing powers to such a Management Committee'.
Nevertheless, the Commission rejected the law
centre's combination of legal services and antipoverty
activity: 'Whatever opinion is held as to the value of
work of this kind, we firmly believe that if it is to be
carried on, it should be funded by political parties or
by members of the local authority. We consider that this
type of work Is not appropriate for a legal service ...
(1:8.20).
CONTRASTING
MODELS
OF
STAFF
LAWYERS FOR THE POOR:
MEETING
LEGAL NEEDS
The Royal Commission proposed its model of law centres in response to a set of particular problems defined
by the welfare state. Traditional professional values fail
to provide an adequate response to those problems, even
as those problems were seen by the Royal Commission.
For professionalism to respond to welfare state problems, it must move beyond the position asserted in the
FinalReport.
According to the Royal Commission, the fundamental legal problems of the poor and relatively poor are
barriers to access, and a shortage of lawyers available to
meet the legal needs of the poor and relatively poor.
General barriers to access include a lack of knowledge
of legal rights and duties, a lack of resources to retain
lawyers, a lack of information about which lawyers to
contact, a psychological reluctance to consult a lawyer,
ind the distant and unattractive image of the legal profession (1:4.23). Because of 'gaps and deficiencies'
(1:2.27), especially in the new 'social welfare law'
(1:3.38), there are 'too many people whose rights,
for want of legal advice and assistance, go by default'
(1:2.28). While cautioning against 'over-litigiousness,'
the Commission sought to 'remedy' the problem of too
many unmet legal needs (1:2.28; see also 5.2, 5.3). The
Commission's proposals to bolster the Citicens' Advice
Bureaux (1:7.18), to provide legal assistance before tribunals (1: 15), includihg improved lay assistance, and to
make other changes reflected a desire to close the gap in
legal services for individuals, especially those without
substantial economic resources. That also was the mission for the citizens' law centres.
The Commission envisioned a partnership belween
research and legal policy, according to which gaps wouldbe scientifically measured and then closed through reform. The citizens' law centres are considered necessary
in this scheme because of their public image of accessibility and because the 'fact that workers in law centres
are salaried rather than fee-earning enables them to deal
with cases with which, although legal aid may be avail.
able, it would be uneconomic for a private practitioner
to deal, at present levels of remuneration for legally.
aided work' (1:8.14). They thus have a unique capacity
to satisfy certain kinds of legal needs.
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This fit between research and reform, legal needs
ani legal services, works nicely to justify the professional approach found in the Commission's Report.
Professionals objectively determine need and the best
way to satisfy it, and professionally-dominated organizations see that they act properly. This type of reasoning,
which certainly is not unique to Great Britain, suffers
from some serious defects. Without attempting a detailed critique of the idea of legal needs, some points that
have been made elsewhere can be summarized.' 2
First, as lawyers in legal centres anywhere can testify, there is an unlimited amount of potential legal
needs to be discovered by creative lawyers. In Mayhew's
words, 'Needs for legal services and opportunities for
beneficial legal action cannot be enumerated as if they
were so many diseases or injuries in need of treatment.
Rather, we have a vast array of disputes, disorders, vulnerabilities, and wrongs, which contain an enormous
potential for the generation of legal actions'. 13 Demands
for legal services can grow to such an extent that the available lawyers could not possibly handle them all. It
is thus always a political decision which claims should be
handled by law centre lawyers. 14 The question is
whether lawyers should make that decision, which at
least preserves the image of professional independence,
or whether it should be determined by the groups whose
lives are affected by the enforcement or non-enforcement
of legal rights. Legal expertise contributes little to correct decisions about such matters as the relative importance of supplementary social security benefits or widespread housing code violations.
It is essential both for political accountability and
effectiveness to entrust decisions about the allocation
of local legal centre resources to a representative community institution, such Pe the management committees of
the current law centres.
Further, many legal problems affect large numbers
of individuals within the community, and methods must
be found to aggregate the claims of the aggrieved persons.
Even if claims can be aggregated as a matter of legal procedures, which is less often the case in Great Britain
than it is in the United States, a legal 'victory' may be a
hollow one if there is not an organization capable of
monitoring enforcement and protecting court-won
gains.' 5 The sum of legal needs and lawyers' actions
does not necessarily total adequate and enforceable legal
rights. When we discuss legal rights of welfare recipients,
tenants, consumers, persons affected by city plans or
environmental regulations, we are not merely addressing technical subjects. Lawyers' victories can quickly be
undone without some sensitivity to political constituencies.
Organizations are necessary not only to monitor
and promote the implementation of legal rights, they
also add two other vital dimensions to the kind of
'law enforcement' suggested by this image of legal
needs in social welfare areas. First, organizations can
provide advice and guidance to members, thus extending the inevitably limited reach of law centres and
lawyers. And second, organizations can assess the proper
balance between strictly legal strategies to enforce rights
and political strategies, such as lobbying. There is a tendency for individuals to grow dependent on lawyers in
spite of the fact that litigation strategies will not always
be as effective as other, more political approaches. In
short, once we recognize that there is a vast potential
to enforce legal rights, and that such enforcement is as
August 1980

much or more of a political than a legal problem, we
must look toward a different model of legal aid (such as
what I have termed the community oriented social
change model). The trouble with such a model, however,
is that it is founded on the interaction of legal and political forms of activity, and that scares away many persons
who would otherwise find nothing particularly controversial about the enforcement of legal rights.
Recognition of the failure of the purely professional
model is growing, however. There is now support in the
United States for some significant modifications in NLF

practices. A recent Legal Services Corporation discussion
paper on the topic of 'Next Steps' for the Corporation,
for example, concluded by suggesting consideration of
reforms 'to maximize relationships between these
[community] organizations and the project' and even to
encourage 'the creation of organizations whose purpose
fs to assert the aggregate rights of its members'.' 6 The
prohibition on group organization, found in the 1974
Legal Services Corporation Act, was relaxed somewhat
in 1977. And most recently, the new President of the
Corporation, Bradley, stated that 'We must increase our
contacts with poor people and with poor people's organizations in local communities and we must not allow
ourselves to become isolated within a narrow legal services community'. 1 7 Lawyers in the legal aid movement,
and more generally In the US. public interest movement
are seeking to remedy the worst effects of the traditional professional model.' 8 These efforts will have to face
the same dilemmas that bothered the Royal Commission, but they have the virtue of pointing toward a new
definition of legal professionalism. Consistent with the
analysis undertaken here, it would be based on the
impossibility of otherwise responding adequately to the
'legal needs' generated by the welfare state. It may be
possible for such an analysis to support a modification
of the traditional professional ideology without sacrificing too much of the political support that depends on
the professional appearance of independence ; id neutrality. Unfortunately, the Royal Commission simply
tried to fit traditional professionalism to welfare state
needs.
To conclude, the Royal Commission faced the dif.
emmas inherent in all legal services that overlap with
politics and attempted to resolve them by insisting on
the integrity of the traditional professional ideal. While
many recommendations of the Commission can be
seen in a progressive light, the approach chosen by the
Commission eliminated the possibility of understanding
the essential aspects of the law centre movement, which,
both inside and outside Great Britain, represents much
more than a movement for staff lawyers. The Commission missed an opportunity to redefine professionalism to
be more consistent with welfare state goals and welfare
state politics.
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Goulburn Gaol:

Henry Report unveiled
byDavidBrown
An inquiry into allegations contained in statutory declarations made by a number of prisoners at Goulburn
Training Centre (GTC) was announced by the new Corrective Services Commission Chairman Dr. A. Vinson on
27 March 1979: (1979) 4 LSB 126, 222. The inquiry,
conducted by regular GTC Visiting Justice (VJ) magistrate R.W. Henry, commenced hearings at Goulburn on
7 May 1979. It sat for three weeks and then sat further
in July, September and October. The inquiry repoit (the
Henry Report) was forwarded to the Corrective Services Commission on 21 December 1979.
On the basis of the report, charges under the Public
Service Act were laid against five prison officers: A.
Penning, then Deputy Superintendent of the gaol and
now Acting Superintendent of Maitland Gaol; J. Hans.
low, then Superintendent of Goulburn Gaol and now
with the Department of Corrective Services (DCS)
establishment section, and officers Tuck, Dries and
Tozer. The hearings of the Public Service Act charges
took place in Sydney in June/July 1980, before another
magistrate, Mr. J. Goldrick; his findings are yet to be
handed down.
Despite repeated requests, no prisoner, prisoner
group or lawyer appearing for prisoners at the Goulburn
inquiry has been able to obtain a copy of the Henry Re.
port. In contrast, prison officers were supplied with
copies early in 1980. On 8 July 1980 the Prisoners Action Group (PAG) finally obtained a copy unofficially
and released it to the media. This article aims to examine briefly the thus unveiled Henry Report, against the
background leading up to the inquiry.
GOULBURN: THE NEW GRAFTON?
The Nagle Royal Commission Report was handed down
on 31 March 1978: (1978) 3 LSB 11l. It was followed

by protracted struggle against Prison Officers Association resistance and industrial action aimed at preventing implementation of its reform-oriented recommendations.
With the exception of the Newling incident (nonviolent homosexual advances by one prison officer - the
only officer charged as a result of the Royal Commission), little attention was paid to Goulburn in the Royal
Commission Report. However with the initial closure of
Grafton 'tracs' (punishment section), Katingal, the construction of a 'dispersal unit' at Goulburn and the continued use of Goulburn front yards as a disciplinary measure, it became clear that Goulbum was taking over Grafton's title as NSW's most brutal and depressing gaol.
Other factors contributing to this development
were: the isolated and provincial character of Goulburn
(similar to Bathurst prior to its virtual destruction in
the 1974 riot); the presence of some of the most intransigent prison officers in the NSW system, backed by
the hard-line Goulburn sub-branch of the Prison Officers Association; the absence of local outside prison activists and local lawyers concerned with conditions and
events in GTC; and the presence of ex-Grafton deputy
superintendent Penning, slated in the Royal Commission lie did use his baton and his fists on many occasions
when there was no violence or provocation by, prisoners . . . lie presented himself badly in the witness
box. lie was reluctant to admit to any forn of violence
at Grafton, and did so only when the evidence supporting such violence was so ovenvhelning that it would
have been foolhardy to deny it. (p.551).
PRESSURE FOR INQUIRY
On 2 November 1978, 14 Goulburn prisoners pleaded
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